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Over the last couple of decades, the inhabitants of New Zealand have 
shown themselves increasingly prepared to deploy the term “culture” and 
to do so for a wider variety of purposes, in a wider range of rhetorical 
contexts and more often with a political edge than ever before. In part, 
this willingness reflects a gradual displacement (not replacement1) of the 
terminology of “race”. Such a displacement has been traced by Wetherell 
and Potter (1992) in their groundbreaking study of the language of racism in 
New Zealand. Culture, they suggest, has become New Zealanders’ default 
term of reference for allocating people into meaningful categories of human 
association and for explaining their subsequent actions. Hence, there is a late 
20th century preference for terms such as “bicultural” and “multicultural”, 
as opposed to “biracial” or “multiracial”. 
But the increasing recourse to culture also stems from a growing ingenuity 
and resourcefulness in applying the term “culture” to new purposes and 
incorporating it into policy discourses. Culture, as a consequence, is invoked 
not only as a means of justifying redress for discrimination or historical 
injustice, but also as a standard of accountability by which the upholding 
of rights (or their suppression) can be measured. My essay attempts to 
outline developments in this area.
THE ROOTS OF CULTURESPEAK
Rather than assume conceptual coherence regarding the notion of culture 
that such applications appear to share, I propose to analyse them as terms 
within a broad and open-ended field of “culturespeak”, a concept generally 
ascribed to Ulf Hannerz (1999). “Culturespeak” is simply a useful cover 
term for all the ways in which people talk about culture. I did not choose the 
concept out of a fondness for snappy neologisms, but because I have found 
it illuminating. If linguistic anthropology purports to be about “talking 
culture” (Moerman 1988), then the approach signalled by culturespeak is 
about “talking up culture”. Culture, in short, becomes the rhetorical topic 
under scrutiny and the valuations placed upon it are assessed. As a result, 
culture serves both as a frame for analysis and as a descriptive term for 
the phenomenon concerned. Some slippage between these two levels is 
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probably inescapable, given Hannerz’s point that anthropologists and other 
social scientists must bear much of the responsibility for the growth of 
culturalist rhetoric in non-academic contexts. The evidence of such slippage 
has to do with the fact that not all the phenomena he analyses receive 
the “culture” label (for example, the “clash-of-civilisations” thesis). But 
there is arguably a conceptual linkage to other matters he clearly labels 
as “culture” so I am not inclined to quibble with the occasional looseness 
of his approach. It is better to include phenomena than to exclude them 
at this stage of analysis.
“Culturespeak” works as a fruitful heuristic device for inspecting the field 
of New Zealand public discourse, because it focuses our direct attention on 
the polysemous ways people talk about the concept. An important opening 
generalisation follows from this: at the level of speech, New Zealand is a 
multicultural society. New Zealand is a society in which culture is talked 
about incessantly and in which, therefore, public discourse in New Zealand 
is multi-“cultural” (that is, “multiply cultured”), whether the speakers 
of such a discourse are proponents of biculturalism, multiculturalism, 
monoculturalism, some confused mixture of any or all of the above, or any 
other form of culturespeak. That New Zealand is also multicultural in 
ways more conventionally understood is not the immediate issue here. 
Assertions about whether New Zealand is “really” bicultural or “really” 
multicultural often tell us more about the author than they do about their 
ostensible topic.
Of course, as Senka Božic-Vrbancic demonstrates in her paper for this 
volume, there are other levels of analysis appropriate to the phenomena of 
New Zealand “culturalisms”, in particular the many fantasies, repressions 
and forgettings that they entail. To adopt and adapt a certain terminology 
from her, however, in practices of New Zealand-speak, biculturalism 
(the TWO) is only ONE of MANY. I have also proposed elsewhere a 
different, though perhaps complementary, analysis of biculturalism as the 
official ideology of The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa 
(Goldsmith 2003).
The phenomena I address in this paper converge with concerns in recent 
European anthropology and social commentary. When Hannerz coined the 
term “culturespeak”, he did so in an essay arising from his perception that 
culture is no longer an elite concept used primarily by intellectuals and 
artists. It is, instead, “just about everywhere” (1999:393). This assertion 
is in turn reminiscent of Norwegian anthropologist Unni Wikan’s claim 
that culture is “loose on the streets” (1999:57) and of another Norwegian 
anthropologist Verena Stolcke’s assertion that “notions of culture and 
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cultural difference… have become ubiquitous” (1995:1). All of these 
commentators imply that the ubiquity and restlessness of the culture concept 
is problematic, with Wikan taking the strongest view of the resulting 
dangers. It is true that the anthropological idea of culture can be abused 
and distorted by lack of precision and that lack of restraint in its usage 
may create political risks, but there are equal dangers in anthropologists’ 
policing of boundaries. According to the views just quoted, culture as a 
resource may be allowed (reluctantly?) to run free, partly because it allows 
anthropologists and other cultural analysts to justify their existence by 
giving them something to analyse. But culture as a topic must remain an 
anthropological preserve. The diffusion of that latter aspect of culture into 
other speech communities has somehow become a problem. It is almost as 
though that there is only one pure definition of the analytical term culture 
and that (self-) reflection on anthropological concepts should be carried 
out only by social scientists. 
In the end, Hannerz’s justification for his essay was to call attention to 
the need to “keep a critical eye on the varieties of culturespeak both among 
ourselves [i.e., social scientists] and in society at large—and try to blow our 
whistles when usage seems questionable or even pernicious” (1999:396). 
I concur with that approach to some extent but wish to emphasise that, 
from a certain perspective, “culture” (like “race”) escaped from the 
disciplinary toolbox a long time ago and there is no chance of reclaiming 
it for anthropologists’ exclusive use (and, of course, they did not invent 
the term in the first place). In fact, as soon as anthropologists used the 
term culture in their teaching and public commentaries, it could not remain 
anthropological property. All such powerful shorthand terms are routinely 
thrown into uncontrollable trajectories that wrench them out of academic 
contexts into lay ones and, after saturating them in everyday populism, drop 
them straight back into the professional lexicon. The fact that such complex 
recycling takes place is predictable even though the forms in which it occurs 
can remain a constant source of surprise.
In such an open-ended situation, we need concepts that do not force social 
thought into procrustean beds. That is why I find the notion of culturespeak 
stimulating. The protean and multifarious meanings of culture have at best 
what Wittgenstein termed a “family resemblance”, a resemblance in which 
A resembles B, B resembles C, C resembles D, but A and D may have little 
or nothing in common. Such a family of concepts is “a complicated network 
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (Wittgenstein 1958:32). In 
the case of culturespeak, this family may be linked by no criterion other 
than the term “culture” itself. 
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CULTURESPEAK AS A EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL MODEL
Even that one small concession to uniformity is debatable, if we 
follow Hannerz’s lead. He trawls through a number of usages that pertain 
specifically to the present-day European situation. Some of them have clear 
counterparts in New Zealand, though often with a distinctive twist. Let me 
deal briefly, however, with two uses on his list that do not resonate quite as 
strongly in the New Zealand context as they do in Europe and further afield. 
I refer first to the “clash-of-civilisations” thesis, stemming from the work 
of Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1996, Harrison and Huntington 2000), 
which postulates a global showdown between pluralist democracy (the 
“West”) and repressive collectivism (various incarnations of “the Other”). 
The relative absence of such concerns in New Zealand, even in the 
aftermath of “September 11” and its attendant global alliance-building 
against terrorism, may reflect this country’s minor role in international 
relations and its diplomatic attempts to consciously cast itself as a mediator 
and peacekeeper.
Interestingly, Hannerz does not comment on the similarity between the 
“clash-of-civilisations” debate and a notion he focuses on later—culture 
shock—that seems to replicate at the level of the shocked individual one 
form of the global clash Huntington portrays in his account. Hannerz’s 
concern, rather, is to map the growth of the “culture shock prevention 
industry”, particularly in the world of business corporations. While this 
industry is relatively undeveloped in New Zealand, it is reminiscent of 
the state’s distinctive forms of cultural diplomacy, where the relationship 
between Mäori and Pakeha2 has become an administrative template for 
encounters with the leaders and people of Pacific island countries. This is 
not a topic I have space to deal with here at length, but it is definitely and 
fascinatingly implicated in the New Zealand rhetoric of biculturalism, as 
well as in this country’s contest with Australia for influence in the island 
Pacific (see McGhie 2002). 
One of New Zealand’s most potent weapons for wielding such influence 
is the (aptly named) “culture group”, a troupe skilled in aspects of Mäori 
performance culture, especially of the dance forms known as haka. Such 
troupes perform on a wide variety of occasions, including displays of 
national identity before foreign dignitaries. Even though only a small group 
of elite performers might be expected to know a large repertoire, in the 
military all New Zealand servicemen and women on overseas detachment, 
both Mäori and Pakeha, are expected to perform haka, usually under Mäori 
leadership. Since the armed forces have a significant role in development 
work (transport, construction, health delivery, etc.), this proclivity is well 
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known in the Pacific. Australia may have a larger aid budget and a more 
powerful military, but for winning grassroots support in the Pacific, New 
Zealand’s proficiency in “indigenous” song and dance styles carries the 
day—or so New Zealand officials like to think.
Another expression of Hannerz’s litany of culturespeak in Europe is 
“cultural celebrationism”, which he sees as having its institutional locus 
in a “cultural sector” sponsored both by corporations and by various 
departments of government. While there are clear New Zealand analogues 
to the examples he had in mind, such as a burgeoning cultural heritage 
movement with strong links to the tourism industry, again I only mention 
one example of the role such a cultural sector plays.3 Ruth Harley, a powerful 
local exponent and controller of funding in this sector,4 has extolled its 
importance as follows: “The cultural sector has an enormous amount to 
offer the rest in New Zealand. It is a crucible for other sectors such as trade, 
international and race relations. It creates new types of ‘glue’ between New 
Zealanders” (Harley 1994:83). This statement from the mid-1990s could 
be read as a nostalgic appeal for culture to play an integrative and resistant 
role in response to the neoliberal hegemony of the preceding decade. Such 
a reading is misleading. Of course, a readiness to reduce culture to its 
economic justifications predates the New Right revolution of 1984, but 
the move to justify a consciously created culture as the foundation of a 
society whose existing communitarian traditions were steamrolled in the 
late 1980s is a classic neoliberal device. Harley does add a rider that “one 
of the downsides of the economic revolution has been the dissolving of 
the glue” (1994:83). But the very idea of culture as glue derives its force 
from the prior assumption of an atomised collection of individuals, and my 
reading is reinforced by Harley’s praise for the “invigorating” effects of 
the new economy and her stated preference for the character of post-1984 
New Zealand (Harley 1994:84). 
CULTURAL FUNDAMENTALISM, BICULTURALISM AND 
MULTICULTURALISM
Two other aspects of Hannerz’s framework are more crucial to my 
immediate argument. The first is cultural fundamentalism, a term introduced 
by Verena Stolcke (1995) in order to shed light on exclusionist and anti-
immigration politics in continental Europe. Michael Jackson has used the 
concept to regret the influence of such intolerance on the treatment of 
refugees in New Zealand (1999). The fundamentalism in question denotes 
the use of cultural identity to deny people asylum and migration rights 
into New Zealand, because of the way in which newcomers might upset 
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a delicate cultural balance. In short, he argues that the good intentions of 
biculturalism may result in injustice.
The other kind of culturespeak on Hannerz’s list of direct relevance to 
New Zealand is multiculturalism, which he defines as “ a self-conscious 
preoccupation with cultural difference and collective identity” (Hannerz 
1999:347). As a description of, or prescription for, cultural pluralism, 
“multiculturalism” has largely been displaced in New Zealand public 
discourse by the concept of “biculturalism” which is organised around 
the treaty-based relationship between Mäori and Pakeha. In fact, 
multiculturalism and biculturalism are widely regarded as politically 
antagonistic, incompatible or at the very least unequal (Pearson 1991, 
2001:119, 151; but cf Bishop 1992). 
Even so, these two complexes of ideas have some theoretical affinity, and 
there is a historical relation between them. They form a pattern in the New 
Zealand imaginary, along with repressed notions like “monoculturalism”, 
which almost no one directly defends, but which is arguably more real 
for most New Zealanders.
One way of managing the contradictions between biculturalism and 
multiculturalism has been to construct them as a sequence. A logical 
sequence may be implied, but usually the chronological order in which they 
should be addressed in the political arena is the explicit sequence. To put 
it bluntly, biculturalism comes first and multiculturalism second (if at all). 
The new Race Relations Commissioner has used exactly that turn of phrase, 
justifying it on the grounds that “[w]e have to be clear about what we want 
as a nation before we can start defining our multiculturalism” (Monsalve 
2002:33; see May 2002). It is intriguing that this sort of rhetoric often 
implicitly recognises multiculturalism as always already existing, while 
stating that its official recognition must constantly be deferred. In fact, 
within the present dispensation, it is difficult to see how multiculturalism 
could ever gain official status. Doing so would imply that the conditions 
that sustain biculturalism have been transcended. Obtaining agreement that 
such closure has been reached would be a daunting task. This is not to say 
that multiculturalism will never become official ideology or that having 
it in place would resolve all difficulties (Hage 1998). An administration 
antipathetic to biculturalism could, in theory, simply mandate a change of 
discourse, as political parties in New Zealand’s small unicameral system 
of government have succeeded in doing in the past. But multiculturalism is 
unlikely to emerge as an official “successor” to biculturalism on the grounds 
that the latter project has been accomplished. That simply does not follow 
from the founding premises of biculturalism.
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Elizabeth Rata (2000a) has mounted an attack against what she calls 
“culturalism”5 per se which could apply to both biculturalism and 
multiculturalism. It is intended mostly, though, to call into question the 
“failed Pakeha project” of biculturalism,6 in a manner reminiscent of 
Jackson’s dissection of cultural fundamentalism. For Rata, culturalist 
theories are those that “explain group division in terms of ethnic or cultural 
or religious difference” (2000a:2). Indeed, in her view they are racist 
but disguise that racism under a veneer of spirituality. However, where 
Jackson sees such fundamentalism as inimical to a genuine appreciation 
of common humanity and of the suffering experienced by asylum seekers, 
Rata’s rejection of culture stems from a neo-Marxist view that it mystifies 
class relations of exploitation and justifies the power of a neo-tribal Mäori 
elite (2000b, 2000c). While respectful of the strength and clarity of her 
position, I remain unconvinced that we can dismiss the concept of culture so 
easily, as a kind of false consciousness. It is simply too useful.
THE EMERGENCE OF CULTURAL AUDIT
In the open-minded spirit of Hannerz’s essay, we should add other 
examples of culturespeak to the list. One form, strongly linked to 
biculturalism in New Zealand, is called in policy statements the “cultural 
audit” (e.g., Durie 1994:15). Unintentionally but suggestively, this phrase 
evokes and reverses the title of a book edited by Marilyn Strathern, Audit 
Cultures (2000). In timely fashion, that volume inspected the topic of audit 
as a cultural practice, which is perhaps the quintessential cultural practice 
of neoliberalism. But none of the case studies therein mentions “cultural 
audit” in the specifically New Zealand sense.7
Cultural audit is concerned with how institutions may be monitored 
for their adherence to various cultural standards—notably, for instance, 
to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. This connects to some legal 
interpretations of the Treaty principles that stress the requirement of 
“accountability”, as well as “partnership” and “participation”. Moreover, the 
Treaty is capable of continually generating new forms of culturespeak, such 
as the notion of “cultural redress” recently coined as part of the Tuwharetoa 
Ki Kawerau agreement with the Crown. Cultural redress apparently refers 
to an area set up in a wildlife reserve “to provide access to traditional 
food sources” (NZH 2002c).
Some of these new forms are no doubt guilty of the sort of culturalism 
Rata excoriates. Certain dangers are apparent, for example, in the particular 
version of audit known as “cultural safety”, which I have subjected to 
critique elsewhere (Goldsmith n.d.). Mason Durie (1994) provides a 
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representative definition: “Cultural safety for Maori means that providers 
will be sufficiently familiar with Maori culture, beliefs and values to 
eliminate the risk of inappropriate practices which cause offence or 
marginalise participation on cultural grounds”. Wisely, he concedes “that 
cultural safety measures are imperfect and that discussion… has not yet 
progressed to the point where there is total agreement either as to its necessity 
or to the level of application” (Durie 1994:15). Unfortunately, the lack of 
consensus has not stood in the way of its widespread application.
Cultural audit has very real consequences. In September 2000, the 
Northland Emergency Services Trust (a helicopter rescue service) was 
threatened with the loss of its contracts with the Accident Rehabilitation 
Compensation and Insurance Corporation because of a failure to show that 
its services were “culturally appropriate” (Jackson 2000). By all accounts, 
this was not a case of gross cultural insensitivity, but one of filling out the 
contract forms incorrectly or incompletely. Also, the Trust chairman said, 
“the helicopter had been twice blessed by Maori”. In sum, if the critique of 
culturalism risks an under-valuation of culture, the institution of cultural 
audit, like cultural celebrationism, represents an overvaluation.
So far, cultural audit is applied only to certain spheres of action where 
public policy makers or bureaucrats set the rules. According to some 
commentators, the private sector may not be exempt forever. If so and at 
least initially, the spread of cultural audit in business is likely to take place 
on a voluntary basis and as an extension of the movement towards broader 
forms of accounting. In New Zealand, a select number of sympathetic 
chief executives are leading the charge. They argue for the need to include 
environmental and social responsibility as modes of accounting, thus 
producing in conjunction with economic returns the so-called “triple bottom 
line”. But wait, there is more. Beyond the economic, environmental and 
social bottom lines, there’s a fourth, the cultural. French President Jacques 
Chirac is reported to have spoken in favour of this quadruple system of 
accounting at the September 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg and New 
Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark was reported to have been taken with 
the idea. The political commentator Colin James notes, however, “[i]n New 
Zealand ‘cultural’ implies something much more than in France, which 
has a dominant national culture, developed over centuries. Bicultural New 
Zealand, with its Treaty of Waitangi, potentially makes quadruple bottom 
line reporting extremely complex. Whose cultures are being reported on? 
And how are the impacts to be assessed?” (James 2002). And what is 
culture, that it can be audited in this fashion?
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DIVISIONS OF CULTURAL LABOUR
Debates over the value of culture are clearly important in contemporary 
New Zealand. Universities are not exempt from this and another pertinent 
example of culturespeak concerns the name of the academic unit housing 
the Anthropology Programme at the University of Waikato where I work. 
It is called the Division of Cultural and Environmental Studies. In late 1997 
and early 1998, members of my Programme entered negotiations with their 
Geography colleagues in order to establish a combined grouping. Our actions 
may have looked like an obedient response to an outbreak of managerialist 
merger mania by faculty leaders of the time, but they were in fact intended to 
leave the constituent parts with more autonomy than the managers thought 
wise. The “cultural” half of our name was designed to signal the inclusion of 
anthropology and cultural geography (as well as to connote an openness of 
some academics in the unit to the burgeoning movement of cultural studies 
worldwide). The “environmental” half of the name was intended to signal 
the presence of the other geographers, such as those teaching Geographical 
Information Systems and resource and environmental planning. The allied 
small Tourism Studies Programme straddled both sides of the name, though 
most of its activities fall under the “cultural” rubric.
When the new name, Division of Cultural and Environmental Studies, 
was first put to a meeting of all the people concerned, it met unexpected 
resistance from certain members of the Geography staff. Two young Mäori 
women academics objected to the term “cultural”. Neither provided a 
lengthy explanation for their stance, but it seemed to me that for them the 
word conjured up the bounded, static and male-dominated “tradition” that 
is the canonical sense of culture in much of the Mäori world and certainly 
that of many Pakeha representations of that world. Once those of us who 
had backed the use of the name clarified the looser and less prescriptive 
concept of culture in anthropology and cultural studies, they withdrew 
their objection. I doubt that either staff member had heard the term 
“cultural fundamentalism” at that time, which predated Michael Jackson’s 
introduction of the term to the New Zealand literature. But as indigenous 
academics outside the mainstream of Mäori studies, they seemed suspicious 
of the fundamentalist uses to which culture can be put. 
Mäori spirituality has, in fact, become entrenched as part of New Zealand 
national public culture. In 2001, a rightwing Member of Parliament, Rodney 
Hide of the ACT Party, criticised the Labour-led coalition government 
for funding overseas trips by kaumatua (Mäori elders skilled in ritual and 
cultural protocol) to carry out the “spiritual cleansing” of New Zealand 
offices in Bangkok (NZH 2001). Such practices are explicitly a form of 
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cultural diplomacy to which I alluded earlier. Hide argued that the activity 
was not “cultural” but “religious”, and that it was “religious hocus-pocus” 
to boot. A conservative commentator and wealthy businessman, Bob Jones, 
called it “witchcraft” (Jones 2001). Hide claimed that the practice entailed 
belief in “a primitive view that there are spirits in buildings which need to 
be exorcised” (NZH 2001). As an anthropologist, what offends me in his 
statement is not just the racism of his accusation of primitivism that is clearly 
intended to appeal to ACT’s redneck constituency, but his assumption that 
religion is not part of culture. Ironically, he was not alone in that assumption, 
as the religion/culture contrast was equally strongly affirmed by a supporter 
of such taxpayer-funded trips by kaumatua. A senior Mäori leader, Sir 
Graham Latimer, was reported to have said that “[t]he ceremony was 
cultural, not religious—two different things” (NZH 2001). 
In any event, the deployment of Mäori cultural practitioners to legitimise 
New Zealand’s diplomatic efforts will continue for at least the foreseeable 
future under the rule of governments led by either Labour or National. It is 
an unchallengeable tenet of orthodox biculturalism. Even Hide implicitly 
recognised that he could not question the policy on cultural grounds; rather 
it was the policy’s supposedly illegitimate appeal to culture, because it was 
religion, that drew his ire. He seemed to accept, for public consumption, the 
theory underlying the version of culturespeak promulgated by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He simply did not accept its application 
to this particular case. 
RIGHTS, CULTURALLY SPEAKING
At the other end of the scale of cultural capital, culturespeak crops up 
in new strategies to curb youth crime. In early 2002, the New Zealand 
government set aside funds to set up two pilot centres for “day-reporting” 
by young probationary convicts. If these proved successful, others were to 
be set up around the country. As well as testing surveillance technology, 
such as electronic ankle tags and curfews, they will feature “compulsory 
culturally-based programmes” (Young 2002). The justification provided for 
these programmes was, according to the Corrections Minister, that “60 per 
cent of youth offenders [are] Maori and up to 10 per cent Pacific Islanders”. 
The newspaper report does not say if “culturally-based” programmes would 
be set up for young Pakeha offenders, but I am confident that they will 
not. This example illustrates two longstanding aspects of New Zealand 
culturespeak: that Mäori culture is therapy for the ills of Mäori society, 
especially of its alienated youth (Wetherell and Potter 1992), and that 
Pakeha don’t have culture. 
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Or do they? There is some ambiguity on this point. In a report on another 
jailhouse matter (Gardiner 2001), the recommendation by a food expert 
(conducting a food audit, no less) that “putting fish and chips back on 
the menu in prisons… is a ‘cultural requirement’ not being met by the 
Corrections Department”. In fact, the headlines diverted attention away from 
the actual wording of the recommendation which stated that “[t]he major 
cultural requirements not being met are for fish and chips and wholegrain 
bread”. But the prospect of inmates receiving New Zealanders’ favourite 
takeaway food as a cultural right was always going to be the newsworthy 
aspect of this story. Indeed, a senior bureaucrat in the Department attempted 
clarification by saying that he presumed “cultural” meant that fish and 
chips is “an icon type of food”.
The encouraging thing, anthropologically speaking, is to see food 
recognised as cultural. The depressing thing, anthropologically speaking, is 
that only certain marked foods are recognised as cultural. And the danger, 
anthropologically speaking, is that culture becomes a catch-all term in 
matters of legal and political negotiation. Here, as elsewhere, my interest lies 
less in the fact of culture being used to justify policy than in the meanings and 
images of culture that such policies and discourses tacitly invoke.
Appeals to culture always carry weight in public discourse, but they are 
not guaranteed success. A landmark legal case demonstrates that the place 
of culture can be contested. Let me note, by way of background, that New 
Zealand law for the time being still allows parents to administer physical 
punishment to their children, to the level of “reasonable smacking”. There 
was a period when that right received an explicitly cultural sanction. In 
1984, the case of Erick v Police upheld the propriety of paying regard “to 
the cultural characteristics of the parent and the family as a measure of 
what is reasonable in all the circumstances” (Somerville 1998:78). In other 
words, beatings could vary in severity according to the cultural standards 
accepted by the ethnic community in question. But in the 1996 case of 
Ausage v Ausage, Judge Somerville reversed this decision. A young New 
Zealand-resident Samoan woman sought a final protection order against 
her father, claiming that his use of force when disciplining her had been 
excessive and therefore amounted to domestic violence. The judge granted 
her request, noting that since the earlier judgment New Zealand had ratified 
the UN convention on the rights of the child. Parents are still allowed to use 
reasonable force, but that will not be allowed to differ “according to ethnic 
background or religious belief. There is to be one universal standard which 
applies to all families in New Zealand” (Somerville 1998:79). 
Nevertheless, cultural rights are alive and well in culturespeak, if nowhere 
else (see, e.g., Wilson and Hunt 2000). Unni Wikan concluded her lament 
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for the promiscuity of culture in contemporary Norway with the argument 
that anthropologists, and the governments they advise, should abandon the 
idea of cultural rights in favour of a firm commitment to universal human 
rights based on the dignity of the individual (1999:63-64). I do not know if 
the Norwegian state has accepted this recommendation, though she implied 
that the tide was turning in its favour. The New Zealand debate has clearly 
not been resolved and is unlikely to be so for decades, if at all. On reflection, 
I suspect this will be true for Norway as well. One reason for this is that 
when people discuss cultural rights there is an almost palpable relief at 
being able to focus on “rights” as opposed to the hard task of defining 
what they mean by “cultural”.8 
CULTURESPEAK AND JUSTICE
Indeed, so long as New Zealand officially espouses its particular version 
of biculturalism, policies inflected by culturespeak may be inescapable. 
Consider Australian, European, or US-style multiculturalisms with their 
demographically grounded commitment to providing resources and 
representation to new or hitherto unacknowledged minorities. On that kind 
of model (which I have drastically oversimplified for reasons of space), 
cultural change is supposed to occur through a kind of osmosis, by placing 
different groups into proximity and often into competition with one another. 
The dominant cultural system is not directly challenged and nor is the state, 
which is supposed to mediate disinterestedly among all groups.
Biculturalism, by contrast, is always a dialectic in which the cultures 
at stake either engage in an explicit struggle for cultural hegemony (as 
perhaps, in Canada) or settle on a mutually defining division of cultural 
labour (as in contemporary New Zealand). Whichever version applies, 
biculturalism is always liable to culturalise the situation, whereas in, say, 
the United States culture looks more like an epiphenomenon of legal and 
political arrangements of the state. American pluralism has clearly been 
based on this way of conceiving difference and commitment to equality 
of opportunity. Contrary to some critics of biculturalism, I think this 
foregrounding of culture as a topic is valuable, if risky, provided it helps to 
keep open the horizons of cultural identity. Where it serves to close them 
down and culture becomes a fundamentalism, dangers loom. 
Biculturalism takes for granted the priority within a variegated cultural 
universe of two primary cultures. In New Zealand, one term in that pair is 
moderately well defined and marked. In terms of the division of cultural 
labour and a number of other deployments of culturespeak discussed earlier, 
there is a robust official role for Mäori culture in New Zealand, even if who 
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or what actually constitutes that culture is hotly contested and the dualisms 
that biculturalism produces may be questioned (see Benton 2002). 
What about the second culture in the equation, the Pakeha? Defining 
Pakeha culture is so difficult that few attempt it and no-one’s efforts have 
attained widespread acceptance. For politicians, leaving the matter vague 
is the safest option. But the notion of biculturalism assumes that such a 
meaning exists, even though the official version of biculturalism entails that 
the culture itself be culture-free, so as not to complicate matters. 
How does all this relate to justice? One way of answering that question 
is to say that the ills of colonialism are not automatically redressed by 
resorting to the politics of cultural identity, however forcefully argued or 
well meant. This is not just a matter of saying that, in the quest for justice, 
a “politics of redistribution” has been unjustifiably trumped by a trendy 
new “politics of recognition” (Fraser 1995, 1999). This critique refers to 
the complaint by some commentators that contemporary obsessions with 
cultural identity have blunted and even obscured harder problems of poverty 
and class-based oppression. Elizabeth Rata’s critique of culturalism seems 
to take such a stance against identity politics, but the debate is more than 
an in-house academic argument. This was shown by the sidelining of the 
Labour policy officially announced as “closing the gaps”. The policy aimed 
at reducing the degree of economic, legal and health deprivation experienced 
by Mäori in comparison to Pakeha on the same indicators. When one policy 
analyst, Simon Chapple, produced data showing that the main differences 
between rich and poor in New Zealand correlated less to ethnicity than to 
other factors, the coalition government led by Labour distanced itself from 
his findings (Chapple 2000). Elizabeth Rata (2000c) went even further and 
maintained that the policy was responsible for “constructing gaps” that 
disguised class commonalities between Mäori and Pakeha. 
My personal view is that both sorts of politics are needed and that, for 
too long, matters of “redistribution” took taken-for-granted priority over 
matters of “recognition”. If the latter now occasionally dominate at the 
expense of traditional “bread-and-butter” issues, then the balance will 
swing back in due course. In the meantime, it is crucial to acknowledge 
that each kind of politics is susceptible to reification, both the politics 
based on assertions of cultural identity and the politics based on presumed 
class solidarity. But while there is a long history of scepticism towards 
extravagant claims for class-based politics, even by those sympathetic to its 
goals, the tools for subjecting identity politics to similar dissection are still 
in the process of being forged.
*       *       *
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Make no mistake, it is extremely difficult to think outside the orthodoxic 
discourse in contemporary theorising on New Zealand society. Even 
sophisticated liberal commentators see universities, in their role of the 
“critic and conscience of society”, as having the duty not to radically 
question biculturalism but, rather, the “special responsibility” to contribute 
suggestions as to “how can the policy be both developed and implemented” 
(Wilson and Yeatman 1995:xv). 
So, who talks up culture and to what purpose? Official ideologies like 
biculturalism as well as unofficial ones like multiculturalism generally 
bypass the hard issues of how to define culture in the first place and how to 
investigate its use in language. By this I mean not just the language of elites 
who have a vested interest in containing the meanings of culture within 
convenient limits, but also the everyday languages of actors whose agendas 
need to be understood rather than ignored by states. Even though I support 
many of the goals of biculturalism, that does not justify a refusal to 
analyse official and unreflexive uses of the term “culture”. Justice will 
ultimately be better served by such scrutiny than by heedless support 
for unreflexive policies.
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NOTES
1.  Thus, New Zealand still has a Race Relations Commissioner, despite that 
fact that a recent name change from Race Relations Conciliator provided an 
opportunity to do away with the term “race”—a term that makes the newly 
appointed Commissioner, Joris de Bres, “uncomfortable”. His rephrasing of 
the role as “a barometer of inter-cultural relations” accords nicely with my 
argument (Monsalve 2002).
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2.  I define “Pakeha” here as the descendants of the mainly British settler popula-
tion in whose name the Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840. Sometimes 
quaintly equated with “[New Zealand] European” or even ‘Caucasian’, the 
term has its own special cultural and political resonance in debates over ethnic-
ity in New Zealand, but these are too complex to discuss here.
3.  But see the “Briefing to the Incoming Minister of Broadcasting: Hon. Steve 
Maharey” (August 2002), prepared by officials of the Ministry of Culture and 
Heritage. This can be downloaded at http://www.mch.govt.nz/publications/bim/
index.html
4.  At the moment of writing, she is chief executive of the New Zealand Film 
Commission, having previously been involved in the quango Creative New 
Zealand.
5.  Rata’s theoretically complex analysis of the term needs to be distinguished 
from apparently similar but more descriptive uses, as when, for example, Pear-
son (2001:145) refers to both multiculturalism and biculturalism as “cultural-
isms”. The cover term saves him from having to repeat the twin components 
in their full form. By so doing, however, he fails to keep in view their distinct 
qualities in the New Zealand context. 
6.  Calling it a Pakeha project, of course, is usefully provocative but somewhat 
unfair, since it is precisely the benefits that accrue to some Maori that sustain it 
as a viable policy of government.
7.  New Zealand academic Eleanor Rimoldi (2000) did contribute a useful essay 
to Strathern’s volume, but it addresses the internationally recognised issues of 
audit faced by universities, rather than “cultural audit” in the sense mentioned 
here.
8.  A clue to why this is may be found in the almost palpable relief that some 
proponents of cultural rights display at being able to switch their focus to 
“rights” after struggling with definitions of “culture”. Konai Helu Thaman, 
for example, neatly sidesteps the issue by stating that cultural rights are 
“the collective rights of a (cultural) group” (2000:3)—which of course avoids 
describing the substance of that which the rights are said to be mobilised on 
behalf of.
